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This is the second portion of a two part article comprehensively
analyzing the governmental immunity doctrine in Wyoming. Professor
Minge concludes that the doctrine still prevails in Wyoming even though
it has been modified by governmental liability for proprietary activity
and a limited authorization for governmental liability insurance in certain instances. He recommends that the judiciary, acting within its
constitutional powers, abolish the governmental immunity doctrine.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM
DAMAGE ACTIONS IN WYOMING--PART II*
David Minge**
IV.

GOVERNMENTAL CONSENT TO SUIT

IN

the first part of this article the doctrine of governmental immunity and the common law exceptions thereto were
explored. Subject to these exceptions, governmental immunity exists unless there is consent to suit, and as a general rule
such consent must come from the legislature. In Maffei v.
Incorporated Town of Kemmeror, 9 the court, in sustaining
a demurrer to a wrongful death action against a municipality
which had liability insurance, said:
We, therefore, hold it is beyond the power of a municipality to waive an immunity which it possesses by
virtue of its being an arm of the state's government
and that any waiver of such immunity must come by
direct action of the legislature or through the clear
and unmistakable implication of its legislative acts.2"'
*The first part of this article was published in 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 229
(1972).
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming; B.A. 1964, St. Olaf
College; J.D. 1967, University of Chicago; Member of Minnesota Bar.
199. 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
200. Id. at 59, 338 P.2d at 817.
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Similarly in Price v. State Highway Commission, the court
noted that the Commission could not waive immunity by purchasing liability insurance on its vehicles." ° ' Since in both
cases the immunity defense was being raised by the governmental entity or its insurer, the cases do not necessarily mean
that claims cannot be paid absent legislative consent. Failure
to raise governmental immunity is a type of consent so long
as the court does not raise the issue sua sponte.02° However,
such ad hoc assumption of liability occurs outside the law of
immunity. Any imposition of governmental responsibility
in areas where the courts have found immunity must come
from the legislature.
A. Express Consent
Express legislative consent to governmental liability can
take several forms, two of which are special legislation and
statutes authorizing municipalities and school districts to
purchase liability insurance and waiving immunity to the
extent of insurance coverage." 3 Both types of consent will be
considered separately below. 0 4 At this point our concern is
with the various statutes of general application which provide for actions against or for compensation to be paid by
governmental entities.
Several statutes of general application authorize suit
against the state in special areas. Section 11-610 authorizes
suits against the Wyoming Farm Loan Board "on any mortgage, contract of sale or lease issued by the board."2 0. Section
23-117 gives land owners a right to claim compensation from
the state for damage done by game animals and game birds
and to appeal a decision on the claim to the district court."'
201. 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946).
202. See, e.g., Caillier v. City of Newcastle, 423 P.2d 653 (Wyo. 1967); Town
Council v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 263 P. 703 (1928).
203. WYo. STAT. § 15.1-4 (1957), §§ 21.1-42 to -46 (Supp. 1971).
204. See infra, pp. 622-25 discussing special legislation and pp. 631-50 discussing
insurance.
205. WYo. STAT. § 11-610 (1957).
206. WYO. STAT. § 23-117 (Supp. 1971). That the damage done by wild animals and birds could be imputed to the state absent a statute is unlikely.
Perhaps this statute should be viewed as a type of insurance funded by
hunting license fees.
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Section 24-29 authorizes suits against the State Highway
20 7
Commission "upon any contract executed by it."
Similarly damage actions are allowed by statute against
certain public officials. Section 15.1-358 provides that the
purchaser of land for delinquent municipal assessments may
recover the amount he paid plus interest from the municipal
treasurer and his surety if the assessments had actually been
paid and a receipt issued. 2 ' However, the same section explicitly exempts the municipality itself from such liability.
Although Section 19-112 provides that the state and its political subdivisions are engaged in a governmental function when
undertaking civil defense and disaster responsibilities and
thus immune from liability, it does provide that civil defense
or disaster workers may be personally liable for their "willful misconduct, gross negligence, or bad faith."2 ' Section
34-26 allows parties aggrieved by the recording of unrecordable documents to recover up to $100 damages from
the county clerk. 10 It is not clear, however, that this last
statute actually creates any new liability. One Wyoming case
indicated that since the recording of instruments is a ministerial, not a governmental, function, errors by a recording officer might give rise to liability even without a statute.2 11 To
the extent this is correct, Section 34-26 could be construed as
limiting to $100 what would otherwise be an unlimited liability.
The Wyoming workmen's compensation law covers all
state, state agency, county and municipal employees engaged
in "extra-hazardous" work, as well as certain other public
officials and employees. 12 The liberal definition of the term
"extra-hazardous" results in rather extensive coverage of
207. Wyo. STAT. § 24-29 (1957).
208. WYO. STAT. § 15.1-358 (1957). The immunity of a governmental entity
for damages done to or the use of private property commandeered during
an emergency might be limited by the constitutional prohibition against
taking or damaging private property without compensation. See VAN
ALSTYNE, A STUDY RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 77 (Calif. Law Revision Comm'n 1963).
209. WYO. STAT. § 19-112 (Supp. 1971).
210. WYo. STAT. § 34-26 (1957).
211. Spaniol Ford, Inc. v. Froggat, 478 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 1970). For a discussion
of the ministerial-discretionary and governmental-proprietary distinctions
in tort liability of public employees see the first installment of this article
at pp. 245-47.
212. WYo. STAT. §§ 27-56 to -61 (1957, Supp. 1971).
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public employees by the workmen's compensation scheme.21
Although immunity is not expressly waived as to those officials and employees, the governmental entities are required to
contribute to the workmen's compensation fund,2 1 ' claims for
compensation are authorized against the fund,21 and appeals
by the injured workmen to the Wyoming Supreme Court are
allowed."' Although not technically covered by workmen's
compensation, most peace and correctional officers in Wyoming are entitled to compensation from the Wyoming Peace
Officers' Indemnity Fund."' The state and counties are required to make payments into the Fund,2 1 and the same principles and procedures apply to recovery from the Fund as
apply under workmen's compensation.2 1 9
Another compensation scheme indemnifies the owners of
livestock which are slaughtered by the State Veterinarian
for having or having been exposed to epidemic disease.2 2
Funds for such indemnification are appropriated by the state
2
legislature and recovery is limited to appropriations."
However, instead of any right to court appeal, the owners are required to arbitrate their claims.2 22 To the extent that such
animals constitute a public nuisance or have no value this
compensation is not required by the constitution.2 The creation of such liability for animal destruction is anomalous in
a state which by-in-large rejects liability for injuries to
individuals.
An express statutory waiver of immunity would appear
to be contained in Section 18-63, which provides that an action
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

221.

222.
223.

Wyo. STAT. § 27-56 (Supp. 1971).
WYO. STAT. §§ 27-49 II(a), -57 (B) and (C), -63 (1957, Supp. 1971).
WYO. STAT. § 27-105 (1957); cf. § 27-50 (1957).
WYO. STAT. §§ 27-130 and -132 (1957). See Wyoming State Treasurer
ex rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't v. Boston, 445 P.2d 548 (Wyo. 1968).
WYO. STAT. §§ 27-183 to -191 (1957).
WYO. STAT. §§ 27-186 to -187 (1957).
WYO. STAT. § 27-185 (1957).
WYO. STAT. § 11-279 to -288 (1957).
See also Wyo. STAT. §§ 11-292.1
to -292.4 (Supp. 1971) and Wyo. STAT. § 11-306 (1957) respectively providing for the indemnification of the owners of destroyed swine which had
or had been exposed to hog cholera and of the owners of cattle having
tuberculosis or Bang's disease.
WYO. STAT. § 11-288 (1957). However, the appropriations for this purpose appear to be generous (See, e.g., Ch. 259, § 50, Wyo. LAWS 1971) and
special appropriations are not unknown (Ch. 72, Wyo. LAWS 1967; ch. 146,
§ 27, Wyo. LAWS 1961).
WYO. STAT. §§ 11-285 to -286 (1957).
Annot., 67 A.L.R. 208 (1930).
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may be maintained on the surety bonds of county officers "to
the use of any party aggrieved .. ,"" In Lynch v. Burgess,
liability was thus imposed upon a sheriff's surety for mental
anguish resulting from an illegal search of the plaintiff's
premises.22 On the other hand, in the recent case of Spaniol
Ford, Inc. v. Froggatt the county clerk's immunity was extended to the surety when the clerk negligently issued a new
certificate of title upon a stolen car.2"' The court reasoned
that the surety could not be liable unless the county clerk was
liable. The Lynch and Spaniol Ford cases are not necessarily
inconsistent. Since peace officers are liable at common law
for a wide range of wrongful acts, 2 7 it is possible that the
sheriff in the Lynch case would not have had any defense of
immunity had he been sued. However, if the sheriff had had
immunity, the surety would perhaps also have been shielded
from liability.2 2 Such a limitation on the Lynch case would
make it reconcilable with Spaniol Ford, and as a result Section 18-63 would not contain any waiver of immunity. Although there is precedent for such a conclusion,2 2 it does not
seem to be required by the law of suretyship. '
In Wyoming the state, counties, municipalities and school
districts are by statute liable and subject to garnishment...
in the same manner and for the same causes as private individAnother statutory provision authorizes garnishuals ....,,I..
ment proceedings to reach the salaries and wages due officers
and employees. 8' 2 It is doubtful the former statute allows
more than making the governmental entity a garnishee. To
the extent a governmental entity is protected from liability
by the immunity doctrine, it could not become a judgment
debtor. Thus there would be no occasion for its assets in the
224. Wyo. STAT. § 18-63 (1957).
225. 40 Wyo. 30, 273 P. 691 (1929).
226. 478 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 1970).
227. See Symposium Police Tort Liability 16 CLEY.-MAR. L. Ray. 397 (1967);
Greenstone, Liability of Police Officer, 6 TRIAL LAWYER Q. 56 (SpringSummer 1969); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 87a (1958).
228. This is certainly the position the Wyoming Supreme Court took in Spaniol
Ford.
229. See Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1423 (1934); cf. Bynum v. Western Surety Co., 323
P.2d 972 (Okla. 1958).
230. Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 10 N.C. App. 70, 178 S.E.2d 18 (1971) ; 10
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1214 (3d ed. 1967).
231. Wyo. STAT. § 1-434 (1957). See also Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-236 and -433 (1957).
232. Wyo. STAT. § 1-433 (1957).
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hands of a third party to be subject to garnishment. Even if
the governmental entity is not protected by immunity, the
justifications for resorting to garnishment are not applicable
to the government as a principal debtor. 3s Furthermore, an
application of the statute in situations where the governmental entity is the principal debtor would in effect permit execution upon public funds, something that is usually not allowed even by statute." 4 Such is not the case, of course, where
the governmental entity is merely a garnishee because as
garnishee the government is holding moneys or property due
someone else.
It should be noted that the statutes consenting to garnishment only name the state, counties, municipalities and
school districts. Whether the consent would also extend to
other special districts is not certain. As a general rule states
and their political subdivisions cannot be garnished absent
a statute so providing."' It is possible, however, to say that
as special districts are creatures of the state legislature, they
are subject to being made a garnishee just as the state is. In
addition it is noteworthy that in 1909 when the statutes permitting garnishment proceedings against the state were enacted special districts were virtually unknown and that this
is perhaps the reason for238the failure of the legislature to use
more inclusive language.

B. Special Legislation
On occasion the Wyoming legislature has passed special
acts authorizing suit against the state to quiet title to property." 7 Similarly, bills have been passed appropriating funds
for the relief of persons who would have had a cause of action
but for governmental immunity.. or who would have re233. See Wyo. STAT. § 1-226 (1957).
234. See note 358 itfra.
235. E.g., Landman v. Du Bois, 191 Okla. 428, 133 P.2d 193 (1942); Home
Owner's Loan Corp. v. Hardie & Coudle, 171 Tenn. 43, 100 S.W.2d 238
(1936); Willacy County Water Control & Impr't Dist. v. Abendroth, 142
Tex. 320, 177 S.W. 2d 936 (1944).
236. Sections 1-433 and -434 were passed as ch. 140, Wyo. LAWS 1909.
237. Ch. 40, Wyo. LAWS 1961; ch. 178, WYo. LAWS 1955.
238. Ch. 116, Wyo. LAWs 1927; ch. 165, § 10, Wyo. LAWS 1925; ch. 103, § 50
WYO. LAWS 1907; of. ch. 32, Wyo. LAWS 1939; ch. 159, § 1, Wyo. LAWS
1929.
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covered under the workmen's compensation scheme had it been
in effect."' What would have been contractual claims have
been satisfied by special appropriation on many occasions.24

Until included in the general appropriation, virtually each
legislative session also passed special appropriations giving
individual owners of diseased livestock the assessed or part
of the assessed value of those animals destroyed by the State
Veterinarian.241 Only if these animals did not in fact have
the alleged disease could there be any liability. 42 It is possible
that the resulting liability would only be that of the State
Veterinarian.243
Both special waivers of immunity and special appropriations are apparently attempts to ameliorate the harshness of
governmental immunity without disturbing the basic doctrine;
the legality of such attempts may, however, be questioned.
Thus in State ex rel. McPherren v. Carter,4 the legality of a
special appropriation.. for the relief of the wife of an undersheriff killed in the line of duty was challenged by the State
Auditor on the ground that it violated several constitutional

provisions. These included the prohibition against "donations to or in aid of any individual... , 26 and the prohibition

against the passage of special laws in cases where a general
law can be made applicable. 7 The court concluded that the
appropriation was not invalid as a donation. It was of the
opinion that although parties do not have legally enforceable
claims against the state, they may have moral claims which the
legislature is entitled to recognize.243 With respect to the
argument that the legislation was invalid as a special act the
court said:
239.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Ch. 33, WYO. LAWS 1949; ch. 54, WYo. LAWS 1941; ch. 135, Wyo.

LAWS

1937; ch. 28, Wyo. LAWS 1935; chs. 152, 153, Wyo. LAWS 1929; chs. 115,
121, 134, 135, WYO. LAWS 1927; chs. 104, 105, 109, 110, WYO. LAWS 1923;
ch. 151, § 59, WYo. LAWS 1909; ch. 103, §§ 17, 18, WYo. LAWS 1907.
E.g., ch. 165, §§ 9, 11, 12, 16, WYO. LAWS 1925; ch. 170, §§ 18, 20-22, Wyo.
LAWS 1921.
E.g., ch. 99, §§ 7-15, WYO. LAWS 1905; ch. 110, §§ 17-22, WYO. LAWS 1903;
see ch. 146, § 27, WYO. LAWS 1961; ch. 29, WYo. LAWS 1917.
See note 223 supra.
Compare Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891) with Spillman
v. Beauchamp, 362 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1962).
30 Wyo. 22, 215 P. 477 (1923).
Ch. 110, Wyo. LAWS 1923.
WYO. CONST. art. 16, § 6.
WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 27.
30 Wyo. at 29-39, 215 P. at 479-83.
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For the court to hold that a general law must be
passed, if any, under which all claims of a general
class of this kind could be presented and paid would,
we think, unduly interfere with the legislative discretion to determine what is and what is not, in its
judgment, a moral, just, and equitable obligation
which demands payment at its hands. The Legislature might hesitate, and refuse, to pass a general
law of that kind, and to that extent change the general
principle of nonliability of the state. It may, however, be willing to give compensation in special cases,
which demand special relief, and we are not warranted in holding that it cannot be permitted to do
so in a249case presenting facts like those in the case
at bar.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not had occasion to
deal specifically with special legislation authorizing suit
against the state, although the above quoted paragraph appears to approve such a course. In addition it can be argued
that if it is proper to appropriate state moneys to compensate
someone with only a moral claim as was done in the Carter
case, a fortiori it should be proper to allow a person with a
moral claim to bring suit on his claim. When suit is being
brought, the claim must be one which, absent immunity,
would be compensable. The moral claims recognized by a
special appropriation may, on the other hand, simply be a
claim which even absent immunity is not legally recognized.
Such indeed was the case in Carterwhere the widow was compensated for her husband's death, which had occurred in a
gun battle. Further, in waiving governmental immunity the
legislature is merely referring the work of a legislative committee to the courts. It has been suggested, however, that since
appropriations cannot be made general they do not constitute
special legislation in the same way as waivers of immunity,
which could be general, and that for this reason courts are
more apt to strike special waivers of immunity in torts
cases.

2

50

249. Id. at 42, 215 P. at 484.
250. 6 Wyo. L.J. 261 (1952). This case note contains a useful discussion of the
Carter case.
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Both special appropriations and special waivers of immunity are piecemeal attempts to deal with the basic injustices of governmental immunity and can generate annoying,
time consuming work for the legislators. 2 1 It is a job which
the legislature with limited time and investigative resources
is poorly equipped to handle. In addition, both types of legislation favor those persons who either have a good relationship with a legislator or are sophisticated enough to know
how to press their claims through the legislature. Further, the
time and expense necessary to secure special legislation undoubtedly discourages people with smaller bona fide claims
from even seeking compensation. Perhaps these problems
with special legislation are why the state constitution limits
it; perhaps the reasoning of the Carter court should be reexamined. If special acts are but ways to deal with some cases
which bother the state's conscience, the state might be better
off without any special acts-just a general statute waiving
governmental immunity.
In the last five legislative sessions no special acts waiving immunity or appropriating moneys for parties damaged
by state actions appear to have been passed. Very few claims
have in fact been presented.2 5
C. Implied Consent
1. Power to be sued
What constitutes legislative assumption of or consent to
governmental liability is not always easy to recognize. Several
political subdivisions in Wyoming are created with the power
to sue and to be sued. 5 ' Although on its face the legislative
251. Although recent session laws indicate that no special relief is being granted,
many people with substantial claims might seek compensation. The Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1970) was apparently the result of
dissatisfaction of the Senate and House Committees on Claims with their
chores. Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United
States 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL L.F. 795. 823.
252. Interviews with Sterling Case, Deputy Attorney General for State of Wyoming in Cheyenne, Wyo., Aug. 3, 1971, and with State Senator Richard R.
Jones, Chairman of Wyoming State Senate Ways & Means Comm., in Cody,
Wyo., Jan. 19, 1972.
253. WYo. STAT. § 15.1-3(a) (1) (municipalities), § 15.1-119 (towns), § 18-48(1)
(counties), § 18-330.10 (special museum dist.), § 21.1-27(a) (school dists.),
§ 21-475(a) (community college dists.), § 35-116 (hospital dists.), § 37-5
(Public Service Comm'n), § 41-389 (drainage dists.), § 41-479.13(3)
(water and sewer dists.) (1957, Supp. 1971).
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authorization "to be sued" may seem like a waiver of governmental immunity, the Wyoming court has held that language
does not constitute any such waiver." ' This illustrates the
traditional tendency of courts to construe strictly any statute
waiving immunity so as to preserve the immunity,2 5 5 and it

is in accordance with the weight of case law elsewhere. 5
However, at least two states have abandoned the school of
strict construction and have used this language as a basis
for imposing governmental responsibility." '
2. Contracts
It has also been argued that in granting the state or a
political subdivision the power to enter into contractual relationships and to sue for breaches of such contracts, the legislature by implication grants the other contracting parties
the power to sue for breaches of contract. This is a type of
mutuality argument. It raises the troublesome and seldom
discussed question of how the governmental immunity doctrine applies to claims based upon contract.2 8
In Harrisonv. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, a liquor supplier sued the Commission for breaching a contract to purchase 4,800 cases of brandy.2 59 The Commission had been
created by statute and given a public monopoly over the wholesaling of liquor within the state.2"' The contract was obviously within the authority of the Commission, and the Commission had explicit power to sue for its breach." 1 Since the
court deemed the Commission's purchasing program a governmental, not a proprietary, activity and thus immune from
suit; it dismissed the authority of the Commission to con254. Bondurant v. Board of Trustees, 354 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1960).
255. Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 117 P.2d 397 (1947).
256. Annots., 86 A.L.R.2d 489, 527-28 (1962) and 25 A.L.R.2d 203, 224-25 (1952);
57 AM. JUR. 2d Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 64 (1971).
257. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1961) ; Herrin v. Perry, 254 La. 933, 228 So. 2d 649 (1969).
258. See Jenkins, Public Contract Remedies in the United States at the State
and Local Level, 1 PUBLIC CONTRACT L.J. 44 (1967); cf. Note, The Sovereign
Immunity of the States, 40 MINN. L. REV. 234, 257-58 (1956).
259. 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947).
260. WYo. STAT §§ 12-38, -89 (1957).
261. Ch. 77, Wyo. LAWS 1935; omitted in 1945 by compiler of statutes as being
superceded by ch. 66, Wyo. LAws 1937 (WYo. STAT. §§ 1-1019 to 1023
(1957)).
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tract for the brandy as irrelevant. As for the argument that
the power to sue on a contract implied a correlative or reciprocal right to sue the Commission, the court said:
The state may sue; it has an inherent power to seek
to enforce its rights and its interests in the courts...
but it does not thereby surrender its immunity as a
sovereign from suit by others. "The right of the
state to sue in its own courts has always stood side by
side with its right not to be sued."" 2
That a general legislative appropriation for the purchase of
liquor might have led to a different result is unlikely. The
Commission would still have had discretion as to what and how
much to buy.
Why the state should be able to assert its immunity in an
action for breach of a contract that it was authorized to enter
into and that was made in conformity with law is hard to understand. Unauthorized or improperly executed contracts
are of course invalid.6 ' But valid contracts ought to bind the
state. To say that one contracts with the state knowing the
risks inherent in its immunity may make the private party's
plight less appealing, but it does not explain why immunity
ought to be applied. It would seem that by authorizing the
state to contract, the legislature is by implication waiving immunity with respect to contracts within the authorization.2 64
For goods or services already received, the legislature has occasionally passed special acts appropriating moneys to pay
65
claims.
At the local level of government the rigidity of the state's
immunity on contract claims yields to the concept of implied
consent to suit as long as the contract is authorized by law
and is entered into in compliance with statutory require262. 63 Wyo. at 26, 177 P.2d at 399 (citations omitted).
263. See Town of Worland v. Odell & Johnson, 79 Wyo. 1, 829 P.2d 797 (1958);
Tobin v. Town Council, 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P.2d 666 (1933).
264. See Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colo. Dept. of Ag., 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d
278 (1957); George & Lynch, Inc. v. Deleware, ____Del -....
197 A.2d 734
(1969); Regents of Univ. of Georgia v. Blanton, 179 Ga. 210, 176 S.E. 673
(1934); Derby Road Bldg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 317 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.
1958); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1964).
265. E.g., ch. 165, §§ 9, 11, 12, 16, Wyo. LAWS 1925; ch. 170, §§ 18, 20-22, Wyo.
LAWS 1921. Of course, if the legislature has authorized suit upon contracts,
there is no immunity if the procedure is followed. See notes 205, 207 suapr
and note 341 infra..
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ments.266 By authorizing the contract the legislature by implication has apparently authorized the private party to enforce
the contract. However, when a contract is in excess of the
authority or the manner of its execution does not substantially comply with statutory conditions, the private party
may not enforce it or even require payment for services rendered or goods received on a quasi-contract theory.2 6 The
courts have reasoned that the legislature would not have consented by implication to suit if the contract was outside the
powers it had granted, and furthermore, that if there is no
valid contract, to permit implied contract theories to constitute a basis for recovery would be an easy method of circumventing the law.2" 8
3. Duty
In Fanningv. City of Laramie,the court determined that
the state legislature had waived by implication the usual
municipal immunity in a situation where the city had failed
to maintain a stop sign."' The court classified the maintenance of the stop sign as an "imperative municipal duty"
266. School Dist. No. 3. v. Western Tube Co., 13 Wyo. 304, 80 P. 155 (1905).
267. Twitchell v. Bowman, 440 P.2d 513 (Wyo. 1968) (School board members at
irregular and invalid meeting had superintendent's contract purchased. In
taxpayer's action, the purchase was held invalid and the money paid was
ordered returned to the school district.); Town of Worland v. Odell &
Johnson, 79 Wyo. 1, 329 P.2d 797 (1958) (Developer advanced funds to
Board of Public Utilities to finance water and sewer improvements in a
subdivision; such sums to be repaid from net revenues produced by providing water and sewer service to the subdivision. Since Board had no
authority to borrow money, the developer was not allowed to recover the
money from the municipality.); Tobin v. Town Council, 45 Wyo. 219, 17
P.2d 666 (1933) (Without advertising for competitive bids or appropriating
money as required by statute, the Town Council had streets improved and
made partial payment; therefore the court refused to require payment of
balance.); School Dist. No. 3 v. Western Tube Co., 5 Wyo. 185, 38 P. 922
(1895) (Contract void because it was not within district's budget and exceeded debt limit). See also Davis v. Board of County Comm'rs, 495 P.2d 21
(Wyo. 1972), where the question of the validity of a contract provision in
which a county as lessee agreed to indemnify and hold the lessor harmless
from all liability was presented to but not answered by the court. But see
School Dist. No. 3 v. Western Tube Co., 13 Wyo. 304, 80 P. 155 (1905)
(Absence of minutes in school board records authorizing warrant or record
in clerk's warrant stubbook for warrant, does not necessarily invalidate
warrant. Liberal construction of board's powers plus ability to ratify contracts that might have been invalid when made led court to find an enforceable obligation.). See Antieau, The Contractual and Quasi-Responsibilities of Municipal Corporations,2 ST. Louis U. L.J. 230 (1952).
268. See Town of Worland v. Odell & Johnson and Tobin v. Town Council, supra
note 267.
269, 402 P,2d 460 (Wyo. 1965) noted in 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 532 (1966).
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which was "legislatively ordained. 2 1 7 Historically a legislatively imposed duty has been the basis for immunity, not
liability. 71 A political subdivision of the state which performed such a duty was thought to be acting as an agent for
the state and thus entitled to its broad immunity.2 72 The
Fanning case appears to represent a break with this rather
arid basis of immunity. The question is how far the court
will be willing to go to find "imperative duties" which are
"legislatively ordained." It is noteworthy, however, that the
defect in the Fanning case, an obstructed stop sign, was
arguably within the traditional municipal obligation to maintain public ways and that the Fanning opinion discussed both
the public ways and the nuisance exceptions to immunity2 7
without indicating how important these theories were in the
decision. If the statutory duty theory which was developed
in the case is thus tied to defects in public ways or nuisance,
Fanning does not expand governmental responsibility. On
the other hand if Fanning is not so limited, it could be the
basis for liability of a governmental entity wherever a duty is
imposed. That the Fanning decision should not be read too
broadly is indicated by a subsequent case in which the court
conceded that a statutory duty-the issuance of certificates
of title on motor vehicles-was present but refused to impose
liability on the ground that the duty imposed was governmental in nature.2"' If the statutory duty doctrine in the Fanning
case is thus limited to activities which are proprietary or
ministerial, the doctrine is meaningless since liability apparently exists in those areas even without a statutory duty."
270. Id. at 467.
271. Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort
Liability, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROs. 214, 221 (1942).
272. Id.
273. See the first installment of this article at pp. 256-61.
274. Denver Buick, Inc. v. Pearson, 465 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1970). Cf. Davis v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 495 P.2d 21 (Wyo. 1972) (Statutory power under
§ 18-149, Wyo. Stat. (1957), to keep buildings in repair does not constitute a statutory duty to do so). It is interesting to note that the author
of the majority opinion in Denver Buick also distinguished Fanning on the
ground that he had dissented in Fanning. With such reasoning, the theory
of governmental responsibility for the performance of statutory duties
has a precarious future indeed.
275. See the first installment of this article at pp. 249-56. See also pp. 245-49 of
the first installment discussing Denver Buick, Inc. v. Pearson, 465 P,2d 512
(Wyo. 1970).
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4. Compensation for Damage
Article I, Section 33 of the Wyoming Constitution promises that: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public or private use without just compensation." If any
governmental entity intentionally takes private property,
uses the property for public purposes and refuses to make
payment, there is clearly a right to damages notwithstanding
governmental immunity.2 7 Courts have reasoned that the
constitutional guarantees against taking or damaging property are self-executing and that the property owner can initiate a claim for damages in "inverse" or "reverse" eminent
domain."'7 However, as observed in the first installment of
this article, Wyoming and most states have determined that
damages caused by negligent performance of public functions
are not included within the constitutional guarantee. 78 Whether the guarantee might obligate a governmental entity
which has received property pursuant to a void contract to
make payment if the property cannot be returned is a problem that the courts apparently have not been asked to decide.
In sum, although the Wyoming court has rejected the
use of the constitutional provision guaranteeing compensation for taking or damaging of property as a basis for imposing governmental responsibility, the potential of the implied waiver in connection with statutory duties, the recognition of implied waiver in connection with local government
contracts, and the express waivers cited in the preceding discussion constitute some noteworthy exceptions to governmental immunity in Wyoming. In addition it should be recalled
that the federal law limits the immunity defense of public
officers and employees in civil rights cases.27
276. See VAN ALsrYNE, A STUDY RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 102-08
(Calif. Law Revision Comm'n 1963); Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the
State8, 40 MINN. L. REv. 234, 255-56 (1956).
277. Id.
278. See the first installment of this article at p. 238. For the Wyoming view
see Chevez v. City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964). Whether taking
or damages resulting from commandeering private property during an
emergency are compensable is apparently covered by statute. See note 208
supra and accompanying text.
279. See the first installment of this article at p. 248.
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The basic unfairness of the doctrine of governmental
immunity has led to a search for effective alternatives. The
purchase of liability insurance is one such alternative."' In
Wyoming municipalities,28 ' school districts,"' community college districts,28 hospital districts 8. and possibly the state.8 .
have legislative authorization to purchase such insurance.
Coverage is apparently extensive.
A. Insurance as a Waiver of Immunity
In Wyoming it is established that liability insurance has
no effect on governmental immunity absent legislative authorization. The first Wyoming case so holding was Price v.
State. Highway Commission in which a motorist was injured
in an accident with a snowplow. 8 ' The Court held that the
defendant was protected from liability for the accident by the
governmental immunity doctrine. In response to the plaintiff's argument that since the Commission carried insurance
covering the liability he sought to impose, immunity ought
not to apply; the court cryptically answered: "[t] he Commission cannot give consent to what the law does not
permit .... ,2287
In Maffei v. IncorporatedTown of Kemmerer, the effect
of liability insurance on immunity in the absence of any
statute was discussed at length.' In that case the plaintiff's
decedent had been fatally shot by a burglar whom he and the
town constable were tracking. Since the town carried comprehensive liability insurance which contained a clause requiring
the insurer to waive the defense of immunity, the plaintiff
argued that the public treasury would not be affected by the
280. For valuable discussions of governmental purchase of liability insurance
see Gibbon, Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and Local
Government, 1959 DuxE L.J. 588; Notes, 33 MINN. L. REV. 634 (1949); 34
NEE. L. Rav. 78 (1954); 18 Wyo. L.J. 220 (1964).
281. WYo. STAT. § 15.1-4 (1957).
282. WYo. STAT. §§ 21.1-42 to -46 (Supp. 1971).
283. WYO. STAT. § 21-475(k) (Supp. 1971).
284. WYO. STAT. § 35-136.7 (Supp. 1971).
285. WYO. STAT. § 9-276.18:69(l), (m) (Supp. 1971).
286. 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 809 (1946).
287. Id. at 395, 167 P.2d at 312.
288. 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
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outcome and the very existence of the insurance constituted
a waiver of municipal immunity. The court rejected this
argument saying that even though insurance might protect
the public treasury, the immunity doctrine was too firmly
imbedded in the common law to enable its circumvention by
the mere purchase of liability insurance. 8 The court continued that even if it conceded that the immunity doctrine
should be waived in situations where the public treasury was
saved harmless, this was not such a situation. The court
argued that in the present litigation there was no guarantee
that the judgment would not exceed policy limits. It also
claimed that even if the judgment were within the policy
limits, the municipality might not be able to recover from the
insurer either due to legal defenses or insolvency of the insurer. Thus the opinion concluded that only with statutory
authorization could liability insurance limit governmental
immunity.2"'
The plaintiff in Maffei had also argued that since the
insurer had agreed to waive the defense of immunity, the
insurer ought to be liable on either an estoppel, waiver or
third party beneficiary theory notwithstanding the municipality's immunity. The court declined to pass on the question
due to the absence of the insurer as a party to the litigation. 29 '
In Spaniol Ford, Inc. v. Froggatt an action against a surety
was also dismissed on the ground that the surety shared in
the principal's immunity from liability; however, the case is
not directly in point since there was no indication the surety
had agreed to waive the defense of. immunity.29' No other
reported Wyoming cases have dealt with this issue of insurer liability. It appears that in the absence of a statute allowing an action directly against the insurance company
without joining the tortfeasor, such recovery from the insurer
would not be allowed.2' 3
289. Id. at 55, 338 P.2d at 816.
290. Id. at 59, 338 P.2d at 818. This holding in the Maffei case was cited and
reaffirmed in the recent case of Davis v. Board of County Comm'rs, 495
P.2d 21 (Wyo. 1972), where the court rejected the argument that a county
should be liable for torts because of the existence of liability insurance.
291. Id. 59-60, 338 P.2d at 817-18; rehearing denied, 80 Wyo. 61, 340 P.2d 759
(1959).
292. 478 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 1970).
293. Gibbon, supra note 280, at 597-99. The continuing immunity of the governmental entity may indicate that it has paid insurance premiums without
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Even if the legislature authorizes the purchase of liability
insurance, governmental immunity is not necessarily waived.
An explicit statutory waiver of immunity to the extent of insurance coverage is, of course, effective. However, absent such
an explicit waiver courts have tended to construe the purchase
of insurance pursuant to mere authorization for such purchases as having no effect upon immunity.29 ' Although the
problem appears to have been considered by the Wyoming
court,295 it is not certain how it would be resolved. In Maffei
the court allowed that insurance purchased pursuant to a statute which did not waive immunity might permit a suit against
the government if certain conditions are met:
[E]ven though the purchase of insurance should be
authorized by statute, the desired [liability] cannot
be assured, unless the insurance company is joined
in the action as a co-defendant and made solely responsible to answer to any judgment rendered, or in
the absence of such joinder, any judgment authorized
to be rendered is limited to be recovered only from
moneys made available by the insurance company
and not otherwise.29 6
If a plaintiff could so structure his pleadings as to limit recovery to insurance proceeds actually collectable from the
carrier, he could apparently recover. Hopefully courts would
allow plaintiffs to so structure their pleadings. Unless this
is allowed, those statutes which permit the purchase of liability insurance will be rendered meaningless. Insurance
receiving any consideration. The courts have decreed restitution of premiums in such situations. See cases cited in Gibbon, supra note 280, at 595
n.24. See also 6 COUCH, INSURANCE § 34.21 (2nd ed. Anderson 1961).
294. Gibbon, supra note 280, at 601-03. See cases cited in Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1437,
1441-44 (1959).
295. Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (Wyo.
1959); cf. National Surety Co. v. Morris, 34 Wyo. 134, 241 P. 1063 (1924).
In the Morris case the court indicated that as a result of legislation requiring banks to provide surety bonds to protect the state's deposits the state
waived its preference in the event of bank insolvency. Governmental immunity is comparable to such a preference in that it too is intended to
protect public moneys. Thus just as the surety bond requirement was said
to implicitly waive the state's preference in Morris, so too authorization to
carry liability insurance could be construed as implicitly waiving governmental immunity to the extent of the policy limits. But see Davis v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 495 P.2d 21, 24 n.5 (Wyo. 1972), where the court implies
that both authorization and an express waiver is necessary. However, the
Davis opinion gives no indication that it. intended to overrule the remarks
in the Maff ei case on this point.
296. 80 Wyo. at 59, 338 P.2d at 818.
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would only be effective in those areas to which immunity does
not apply-areas in which coverage could be purchased without legislative authority." 7
It should be noted that the limited effectiveness of liability insurance absent legislative consent and waiver of immunity does not mean that the carrying of such insurance is
without any justification. 98 Those areas in which there is
governmental responsibility-such as for proprietary activities-can be covered. In addition, liability insurance covering the liabilities of public employees for negligence is undoubtedly a legitimate fringe benefit; however, the limited
degree of employee liability in Wyoming would limit the risk
being covered. Finally, governmental entities might even
want to carry liability insurance simply to protect themselves
against an unexpected change in the immunity doctrine. No
special legislation should be needed to purchase insurance for
these purposes. Since they are liabilities to which the government and its employees are exposed absent insurance, the
payment of insurance premiums is merely a prudent substitute for payment of the claims themselves, or in the case of
employees they are a benefit comparable to wages. However,
paying extra premiums for coverage of immune activities
would seem to be an unauthorized expenditure of public
moneys for which the responsible government officials might
even be liable. 99 Since only the legislature apparently has
the power to authorize compensation for injured persons directly out of the public treasury,"' it would seem that indirect
compensation through the payment of insurance premiums
should also require legislative authorization.'
297. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Village of Wadsworth, 109 Ohio St. 440, 142 N.E. 900
(1924). Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1437, 1447-48 (1959).
298. Many of the ideas which follow are more fully developed in Gibbon, supra
note 280, at 591-95.
299.

See Peterson, Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, 26 MINN.
L. REv. 854, 854-55 (1942).

300. See 56 AM. JuR.2d Municipal Corporations,Counties & Other PoliticalSubdivisions, § 804 (1971); 18 MCQUIIN, MUNICIPAL CORPOATIONS § 53.28
(3rd ed. 1963).
301. See Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808
(1959). It is ironic that when the author of the Maffei opinion was the
Wyoming Attorney General, his office issued an opinion advising the
Trustees of the University of Wyoming that although both the University
and its employees enjoyed immunity from liability for the negligent operation of university vehicles, it was within the discretion of the Trustees to
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B. Statutes Authorizing Insurance
1. Municipalities
Perhaps the most important exception to municipal immunity in Wyoming is the presence of liability insurance.
Section 15.1-4, Wyoming Statutes, authorizing cities and
towns to purchase liability insurance and waiving immunity
to the extent of coverage, reads as follows:
(a) Any city or town may carry liability insurance
in an amount deemed necessary by the governing
body. The insurance shall be on standard policy
forms approved by the state insurance commissioner,
with companies authorized to do business in Wyoming, and shall be paid out of the general fund of
the city or town.
(b) Any person damaged by the claimed negligent
acts of a city or town, its officer, servants, employees
or agents so insured may maintain an action for
damages against the city or town. The amount of
damages recovered shall not exceed the limits of the
policy or policies of insurance. No city or town may
plead its governmental immunity as a defense in any
action involving its liability insurance.
(d) This section applies only to the negligent acts
of the cities or towns, their officers, servants, employees or agents in the performance of governmental functions.
This statute was evidently the legislative reaction to the case
0 2 which was
of Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer,"
decided less than two years before the first version of Section
15.1-4 was enacted."'
purchase liability insurance to compensate persons injured by such negligence. Wyo. Att'y Gen. Op. May 17, 1951 in OPINIONS OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WYOMING 1948-53, 541 (1953).

This is contrary to

an earlier opinion of the Wyoming Attorney advising a school district that
it could not purchase liability insurance in the absence of liability. Wyo.
Att'y Gen. Op. Sept. 29, 1931 in BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WYOMING 1931-1933, 136 (1932).

See also Borchard,

Recent Statutory Developments in Municipal Liability in Tort, 2 LEGAL
NOTES ON LOCAL GOV'T 89, 96-97 & nn.65, 66 (1936) collecting and discussing
the attorney generals' opinions from various states the majority of which
advised against the purchase of insurance in that context.
302. 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
803. Ch. 81, Wyo. LAWS 1961.
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Although Section 15.1-4 supplies the legislative consent,
the lack of which had blocked recovery in the Maffei case, the
section is obviously less than an abolition of municipal immunity. It merely authorizes the purchase of liability insurance and only waives immunity to the extent of the limits of
insurance so obtained. If a municipality chooses not to purchase insurance or purchases nominal coverage, the section is
of little effect. The crucial questions thus become how many
municipalities are purchasing liability insurance and what
are the policy limits. A survey of Wyoming municipalities
tabulated in Table I indicates the nature and extent of their
insurance purchases.

Municipal Insurance...
Cities
Towns between
Towns
under 500 500 and 4,000 4,000 and over
Number of
41
municipalities
Number sent
11
questionnaires
Number of
questionnaires
5
returned
Number
1
with insurance
Percentage of
those returned
20%
with insurance
Average policy limits:
Property damage* N.A.
Bodily injury:
N.A.
One person
N.A.
More than one

26

16

16

16

12

14

10

12

83%

86%

$ 22,000

$ 83,000

$106,000
$267,000

$127,000
$300,000

*When dual limits for property insurance were given, the lower (single person)
limit was used.
304.

Survey conducted by author in July, 1971.
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That more than 80% of the communities over 500 population responding to the survey carried liability insurance
seems remarkable in view of the voluntary nature of insurance. There are several possible reasons for this high degree
of coverage. Large areas of municipal liability even without
the waiver of Section 15.1-4 probably led many communities
to take out insurance even before the enactment of that section
simply to protect against existing liability. Some municipal
officials feel that the community ought to reimburse those
persons injured by its activities." 5 Such officials might also
desire insurance to cover their own potential liability. Insurance agencies undoubtedly promote such purchases. Although the low percentage of smaller towns with insurance is
perhaps also remarkable, it is not too troublesome. Only those
municipalities over 500 are apt to have full time employees,
own vehicles, provide municipal services and thus injure
persons or damage property.
Since Section 15.1-4 only waives immunity to the extent
of policy limits, the amount of coverage purchased is crucial.
The average limits shown on Table I are barely adequate for
private risks. It is not hard to imagine incidents in connection
with municipal utilities (or even automobile accidents) which
give rise to claims exceeding one million dollars. If the purpose of the insurance is to make possible recovery equivalent
to that available from a private business, insurance adequate
for this purpose should be secured. If municipalities intend
to provide limited compensation for injuries arising from
governmental functions only, whatever coverage they feel is
humane compensation would be adequate."' However, in view
of the unlimited liability of municipalities for proprietary
functions even with insurance, the purchase of policy limits
that are low could be considered an abuse of discretion by
municipal officials.
The survey questionnaire asked what exclusions from
coverage were contained in the insurance policies. While it is
impossible to identify any patterns in the exclusions men305. Id.
306. Compare payment schedules in Workmen's Compensation schemes which
provide modest benefits as contrasted to jury verdicts.
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tioned, they include false arrest, libel, slander, airport accidents, and products liability. The first three are in the nature
of intentional torts which liability insurance possibly cannot
cover." 7 The fourth exclusion, airport accidents, is questionable since most courts have classified airports as proprietary..
and thus municipalities are exposed to a liability which they
ought to consider insuring against. The fifth exclusion, products liability, is curious. It apparently is the insurance industry's reaction to an expansive area of liability, but its use
in the municipal as opposed to manufacturing area is inappropriate. What, for example, does it mean with respect to the
municipalities' liability for street maintenance or the purity
of water T
In discussing insurance, the Maffei case pointed out the
hazards to municipalities of insolvent insurers and insurers
who though solvent refuse to pay a claim."0 Presumably the
fact that Section 15.1-4(b) only prohibits the municipality
from pleading the defense of immunity in an "action involving its liability insurance" means that if an insurer cannot
or will not pay a claim, governmental immunity can be invoked. Thus the hazards which bothered the Maffei court are
hopefully avoided. However, in allowing the immunity doctrine to be thus invoked two possible problems are created for
the injured person. First, since the insurer is only secondarily
liable, such inability or legally justified refusal to pay might
not be known until after litigation has been concluded. Although raising the immunity defense at that point would be
procedurally awkward, courts would probably be required to
permit it. Since municipal liability is apparently limited to
what the insurer can be compelled to pay, the statute should
perhaps authorize a direct action against the insurer. The
second problem is that municipalities might defeat recovery
by purchasing coverage from financially unsound companies
or by refusing to comply with policy requirements such as
307. 9 COUCH, INSURANCE § 39:15 (2d ed. Anderson 1962). Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d
320, 331 (1968).
308. 18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.96 (3d ed. 1963).
Cf. City
of Cheyenne v. Board of Comm'rs, 484 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1971), holding certain leased airport buildings proprietary for tax assessment purposes but
not reaching the question of whether the airport itself was proprietary
for tax assessments or liability purposes.
809. 80 Wyo. at 56, 338 P.2d at 816.
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notifying the insurer of accidents within a specified time or
co-operating in litigation. Since the purchase of insurance is
voluntary, it would be harsh to place the risk of carrier insolvency upon the municipality. However, to allow the
municipality to defeat recovery by intentional or negligent
noncompliance with policy requirements would be even more
unfair to the injured person. Either the municipality ought
to be responsible for such wrongful acts of its employees or
the carrier should not be allowed to escape liability-perhaps
on the theory that since the policy is solely for the benefit of
third parties, actions by the municipality cannot defeat
recovery.
Another problem area is presented by the fact that Section 15.1-4 is limited to "governmental functions." It is clear
that the section does not limit recovery to the amount of insurance coverage for proprietary activities. In Town of
Douglas v. York a judgment in excess of policy limits was
entered by the court on a claim rising out of an activity which
Thus the governmentalwas classified as proprietary. 1
proprietary distinction with all of its shortcomings is maintained. It is not clear, however, that liability is necessarily
confined to policy limits for all governmental functions. As
the previous discussion pointed out, there have been exceptions
to immunity for governmental functions. 1' These exceptions
include statutory duty, defects in public ways, and perhaps
ministerial acts and nuisance. That what had previously been
unlimited liability for certain types of governmental functions should now be limited by insurance coverage would be
inappropriate. The apparent purpose of Section 15.1-4 was
to permit an expansion of, not to impose limitations on, governmental responsibility for governmental activity.
In addition, Section 15.1-4(d) speaks of "negligent activities." At least in the case of nuisance, negligence is not
always necessary for liability. It is doubtful that the act intended to abolish municipal responsibility for nuisances occurring in connection with governmental functions.
310. 445 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1968).
311. See the previous installment of this article pp. 255-62.
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Although liability arising from proprietary functions and
perhaps nuisance, defects in public ways, breach of statutory
duty and other such theories is not covered by Section 15.1-4,
that does not necessarily mean that insurance coverage against
such liability cannot be purchased. As noted previously municipalities have the implied power to insure against liabilities
arising out of proprietary activities.8 1" The important point
to note is that Section 15.1-4 only deals with liability insurance
and waiver of immunity for negligence in the performance
of governmental functions-presumably those for which there
would have been immunity but for the statute.
One issue on which the statute is silent concerns the
traditional and probably necessary rule of granting immunity
for discretionary activities. Discretionary acts of municipal
officials may occur in the course of governmental functions."'
If simply because insurance coverage has been purchased
there is to be liability for negligence in the exercise of discretion in connection with governmental functions, perhaps
too much immunity has been waived as a matter of public
policy. It would seem preferable to allow discretionary immunity except for situations involving abuse of discretion. " '
A mechanical problem with liability limited to insurance
is the situation involving several injured parties with aggregate damages in excess of policy limits.1 5 It is necessary to
join all plaintiffs in one action or some of the potential plaintiffs may recover nothing. Perhaps plaintiffs should be required either to interplead others with possible claims growing
out of the same occurrence or to allege that there are none.
Presumably if there are several claimants with claims exceeding policy limits, they should share ratably in the insurance
funds according to their relative damages."1 '
See note 297 supra.
See the previous installment of this article p. 246.
See 3 DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 26.04 (1958, Supp. 1970).
This has apparently already occurred. See Town of Douglas v. Nielsen,
409 P.2d 240 (Wyo. 1965); Town of Douglas v. York, 445 P.2d 760 (Wyo.
1968).
816. Of course, if the act of the municipality which gives rise to the cause of
action is not governmental but proprietary in nature, there would be general
municipal liability for damages exceeding policy limits.
312.
313.
314.
315.
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2. School Districts
A series of sections in the statutes authorize, and in one
situation require, school districts to have liability insurance. 1 7
The key section, Section 21.1-45, provides as follows:
(a) The board of Trustees of each school district
within the state may procure a policy or policies of
comprehensive liability insurance which would save
the school district harmless from financial loss arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment for
personal injury or death occasioned by the alleged
tort of any officer, employee, or agent of the school
district. The policy or policies shall specify a maximum amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00)
or more payable for injury to any one person and a
maximum amount of five hundred thousand dollars
($500,000.00) or more payable for any one accident
regardless of the number of persons injured.
(b) The defense of governmental immunity is expressly waived to the extent of any insurance coverage of the district involving any such alleged tort. All
defenses which would be available to a private corporation in an action against such corporation for
the torts of its officer, employees, or agents shall be
available to a school district in any action against it
arising under this section.
(c) This section shall not apply to any insurance on
school vehicles or transportation of children.
Several aspects of Section 21.1-45 require comment. As
with municipalities, coverage is optional. Only if school districts purchase liability insurance will there be any waiver of
immunity. Table II indicates that more than 80% of the districts carry liability insurance. It is interesting that this incidence of coverage is approximately the same as was found in
the survey of municipalities. It is, however, even more remarkable than the high incidence in the case of municipalities because school districts have historically enjoyed a much greater
degree of governmental immunity than municipalities ;318 in
fact the Wyoming Supreme Court has not yet been asked to
decide a case involving the immunity of a school district.
317. WYo. STAT. §§ 21.1-42 to -46 (Supp. 1971).
318. See first installment of this article at pp. 232-33, 241-42.
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Since immunity is only waived to the extent of insurance
coverage, policy limits are also important. The limits shown
on Table II are comparable to the limits in policies carried
by municipalities and are subject to the same criticisms. 19
TABLE II

School District's General Liability Insurance.2
Number of pupils
Under 75
76-500
501 and over
Number of districts
in state
24*
40
32
Number of districts
answering questionnaire
4
28
32
Number with general
liability insurance
Percentage with
general liability
insurance

3

75%

24

27

86%

84%

Average policiy limits
for general liability
insurarce :**
Property damage*** N.A.

$ 28,333

$ 27,000

$100,000
$383,333

$100,000
$340,000

Bodily injury:
One person
More than one

N.A.
N.A.

* Many of the small districts have no pupils or no facilities.
** Questionnaire did not ask for data on policy limits; however, 9 districts sup-

plied this information anyway. All had approximately the same limits.
***When dual limits for property insurance were given, the lower (single person)
limit was used.

The significance of the dollar figures in the last sentence of
Section 21.1-45(a), and their relationship to coverage that is
319. See p. 637 supra. Of course since motor vehicle coverage for school districts is separate and the policy limits are generally somewhat higher, the
astronomical claims that could result from a serious school bus accident
are not of concern at this point in the discussion. See Table III, p. 645
infa and the accompanying discussion of school district motor vehicle
insurance.
320. Survey conducted by the Wyoming School Boards Ass'n, Laramie, Wyo.,
Oct., 1971. The general liability policies in this table do not include coverage
of motor vehicle accidents. Such coverage is separate and is detailed in
Table III at p. 645 infra.
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actually being purchased as indicated on Table II is uncertain.
The $50,000/$500,000 figures could either represent the maximum or the minimum amount of insurance school districts are
authorized to purchase. This writer would suggest they set
a minimum. The dollar amounts seem to be only the maximum
payable to one person or in one accident under the lowest
permitted bodily injury coverage. Such a construction of the
last sentence in the section would give effect to both the
phrases" maximum amount" and "or more" which are otherwise irreconcilable. However, such a construction would mean
that school districts are required to choose between no coverage (and no waiver of immunity) and $50,000/$500,000 coverage-which is evidently more than they want. The disparity
between the coverage being purchased and the apparent requirement of the section is probably of no significance. In
view of the ambiguity of the statute it would be petty indeed
for any school district, insurer or court to claim that policies
with limits less than $50,000/$500,000 are void. Whether these
minimum policy limits have discouraged some school districts
from purchasing insurance because of the amount of the
premium is unknown.
It is noteworthy that Section 21.1-45 only authorizes insurance against liability for personal injury or death caused
by officers, employees and agents of the district. Property
coverage is not authorized. Since there is no apparent reason
for this omission, it would seem advisable to include property.
As Table II reveals, school districts with liability insurance
have purchased such property coverage. As noted above, the
effectiveness of such unauthorized coverage as any waiver
of immunity is doubtful and premiums paid therefor are
perhaps improper expenditures of district funds. 2 1
It is also hard to understand why coverage must be limited
to torts caused by officers, employees and agents. It would
seem that injuries could arise from situations such as the condition of buildings for which a district ought to be liable but
which are not attributable to the tortious acts of officers, employees and agents.
821.

See p. 634 8upra.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court has not yet dealt with the
liability of school districts for damages. Assuming, however,
that even in the absence of Section 21.1-45 a school district
could be held liable in some situations for torts, does this
statute limit liability to the policy limits even in those situations in which liability would otherwise have been unlimited I
Since the statute was apparently intended to expand the area
of liability, not limit it, it would seem that such a limitation
on recovery would be unjustified.2 2
The clause in Section 21.1-45(b) saving the defenses of a
private corporation to school districts is probably superfluous. That the district ought to enjoy these defenses should be
beyond dispute.2 '
Section 21.1-45 does not, by virtue of the language in subsection (c), authorize insurance on school vehicles or the
transportation of children. That matter is covered in Section
21.1-42, which requires that either school districts or the
owners of vehicles contracted for use by school districts must
carry liability insurance
.. covering any vehicle used for the transportation
of school children or used in the operation of the
school district . . . . The defense of governmental
immunity is expressly waived in any action to the extent of any insurance coverage of the district involving such an insured vehicle.
Two problems with this section should be noted. First, it requires no minimum policy limits. The value of the insurance
requirement can thus be nullified by nominal purchases.
Table III indicates that, in fact, the coverage being purchased
is quite substantial and exceeds the coverage purchased by
school districts for liability insurance, other than for motor
vehicles (Table II), and by municipalities for comprehensive
liability insurance (Table I). However, one cannot help but
wonder if a $500,000 policy would be adequate in case a school
bus full of students had a serious accident.
322. Cf. discussion of comparable problem with regard to section 15.1-4 of the
Wyoming Statutes authorizing insurance for municipalities, pp. 635-40
supra.
323. Compare with section 15.1-4 of the Wyoming Statutes which does not explicitly save defenses. Surely defenses of a private corporation are not
waived under section 15.1-4.
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TALE III

School District's Motor
Vehicle Liability Insurance 2
Un der 75

Number of pupils
76-500
501 and over

Number of districts
instate
24*
Number of districts
answering questionnaire
4
Number with motor
vehicle liability
insurance
4
Percent with auto
liability insurance
1OO%
Average policy limits
for auto liability
insurance:
Property**
$ 28,000
Bodily injury:
One person
$ 70,000
More than one
$273,000
Policies excluding
vehicles not owned
by the district
Percent of policies
excluding vehicles not
owned by school
district
50%

40

32

28

32

28

32

100%

100%

$159,000

$ 98,000

$231,000
$450,000

$145,000
$506,000

5

36%

16%

* Many of the small districts have no pupils or no facilities.
**When dual limits for property insurance were given, the lower (single person)
limit was used.

The second problem with Section 21.1-45 is that it only
requires insurance on and waives immunity with regard to
vehicles owned by the school district or private vehicles used
by the school district under contract. Undoubtedly school
324. Survey conducted by Wyoming School Boards Ass'n, Laramie, Wyo., Oct.,
1971.
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district personnel frequently use their cars for district business on an informal basis yet there is no provision to require
that they carry insurance or even to authorize the school district to carry such blanket coverage and waive immunity. In
fact, however, Table III indicates that a large percentage of
the districts' policies do cover any vehicle, even privately
owned ones, used for school district purposes.
Finally, when Section 21.1-42 is compared to Section
21.1-45, it is of interest that property damage coverage is evidently required, tortious acts need not be those of an "officer,
agent or employee," coverage is mandatory and defenses are
not explicitly saved. The presence of two sections on liability
insurance with such conflicting provisions is not desirable.
Section 21.1-44 authorizes insurance to protect school
districts' board members, teachers and other personnel against
financial loss arising out of any claim, demand, suit,
or judgment by reason of alleged negligence or other
act resulting in accidental bodily injury or death to
any person within or without the school building;
provided, such board member, teacher, or other personnel at the time of the accident was acting in the
discharge of his duties within the scope of his employment. Each board of trustees may procure appropriate policies of insurance to maintain this protection, or it may elect in its discretion to act as a selfinsurer. This section shall not be construed as creating or tending to create a liability of the school district so protecting or insuring board members, teachers, or other personnel, nor shall the failure to procure such insurance as is authorized by this section
be construed as creating any liability of the school
district.
If the principles developed in the Wyoming cases regarding
individual liability are relevant to the school district situation, there are few situations in which school district personnel would be liable if the district itself was not liable. 25 To the
extent this is the case, the statute does little but perhaps permit the purchase of insurance in the limited area of individual
liability. Assuming, however, that the section was intended
325. See the first installment of this article at pp. 243-49.
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to authorize coverage of acts for which personnel are not
normally liable, that would not necessarily mean that there
would be a waiver of immunity to the extent of coverage.
Mere authority to carry insurance may not be a waiver of
immunity. 2 6 Thus the school district or the insurer could
probably still assert the governmental immunity defense. In
fact, the section concludes by saying it is not in any way to be
construed as creating liability on the part of the school district. In this connection note also that the section authorizes
self insurance. To be a self-insurer and yet immune from
suit is incongruous indeed. Finally, the section omits any
provision authorizing property damage coverage.
Section 21.1-43 authorizes school districts to provide accident insurance to students or make it available for their
purchase. It has only a tenuous relationship to governmental
immunity since it is not clear that the insurance is a substitute for what would normally be the liability of a private organization. Perhaps it is more analogous to a workmen's
compensation scheme both in that recovery would be independent of fault and in that the payment schedule is less than
the typical jury verdict for comparable injuries. In any
event, the section is worded similarly to Section 21.1-44; there
is the same doubt over whether it waives any immunity, and
it disclaims the creation of liability-even when the district
is a self insurer.
3. Community College Districtsand Hospital Districts
Section 21-475(k) of the Wyoming Statutes authorizes
the boards of community college districts to:
Insure against public liability or property damage
concerning the facilities authorized by the governing
board, and insure and hold harmless from liability
all administrative and teaching personnel, and all
other employees of the community college district 2 7
Similarly in authorizing hospital districts to issue revenue
bonds, Section 35-136.7 of the Wyoming Statutes authorizes
326. See pp. 633-34 supra.
327. WYO. STAT. § 21-475(k)

(Supp. 1971).
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the board of trustees of the district to insure facilities acquired or improved with the proceeds of such bonds against
public liability. 28 Neither of these statutes contains any
waiver of immunity. Whether the statutes would be construed
as authorizing the purchase of insurance for immune activities
is uncertain. The earlier discussion of this problem in connection with the Maffei case would govern. 29
4. The State
The only statutory provisions for the purchase of insurance by the State of Wyoming and its boards, agencies, commissions and other constituent bodies is contained in legislation passed by the 1971 legislature which authorizes the
newly created State Department of Administrative and Fiscal
Control to:
(1) Secure and maintain insurance or otherwise protect against fire and other perils on all buildings and
structures and the contents thereof, and other properties owned by the State of Wyoming or any of its
agencies. The insurance so to be secured and maintained shall be in an amount which, in the judgment
of the department, shall be adequate to protect the
interest of the State of Wyoming and, where appropriate, the interest of the United States.
(m) Secure and maintain insurance against the risks
of fire and theft and such other insurance as shall be
deemed necessary on all motor vehicles and trailer
attachments owned by the State of Wyoming or any
of its agencies. The insurance so to be secured and
maintained shall be in an amount which, in the judgment of the department, shall be adequate to protect
the interest of the State of Wyoming. The department shall not, however, under the mandate of this
section, purchase any policy insuring against the
risks of collision or upset. "'
It is not clear that either of these paragraphs authorizes
the purchase of liability insurance or waives governmental
328. WYO. STAT. § 35-136.7 (Supp. 1971).
329. Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
See pp. 633-34 8upra.

330. Ch. 203, § 21, Wyo. LAWS 1971 codified as Wyo. STAT. § 9-276.18:69 (Supp.
1971).
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immunity. In fact neither paragraph even mentions liability
insurance. The phrases "other perils" and "such other insurance" constitute the only basis for buying liability coverage.
Both phrases are highly ambiguous and follow references to
particular types of insurance which are designed to compensate for damage to state property. Also, both paragraphs only
authorize coverage adequate to protect the interests of the
State of Wyoming. To the extent the state has immunity from
suit, it has no legal interest which would be protected by the
purchase of liability insurance. It is doubtful the moral responsibility that public officials may rightfully feel to compensate injured parties would constitute any insurable interest.
It should also be noted that paragraph (m) prohibits the
purchase of insurance "against the risks of collision or upset."
Since collision insurance is a particular type of policy which
only covers damage to the insured's vehicle,3 31 a prohibition
against only this type of insurance would simply mean that the
state would absorb the damages to state owned vehicles. "IRisks
of collision or upset" is, however, a much broader phrase and
would seem to include all liabilities arising out of an accident.
Although such a broad construction of the phrase could be
justified on simple word analysis, a narrow construction
which limited the prohibition to collision insurance would be
more in keeping with the insurance industry's understanding
of the term and probably with legislative intent. In any case,
even if this is not a prohibition against the purchase of automobile liability insurance, it certainly is not an explicit authorization for such insurance.
Assuming that one or both of the paragraphs authorize
the purchase of liability insurance, they only deal with limited
areas-real estate and motor vehicles-and there is no indication that governmental immunity would be waived. The
earlier discussion of the Maffei case points out the uncertain
effect of mere authorization to purchase insurance on the
immunity question. 3 '
331. 11 COUCH, INSURANCE § 42:192 (2d ed. Anderson 1963).
332. Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959);
see pp. 633-34 supra.
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Notwithstanding the uncertainties surrounding the authority of the state and state agencies to carry liability insurance, virtually all state vehicles are covered by liability insurance, with the named insured including both the state and
employees. 3 The University of Wyoming has purchased
comprehensive liability insurance in addition to liability insurance on motor vehicles." 4 All of these state policies include clauses in which the insurer waives the defense of governmental immunity. 35 Unless claims exceed policy limits or
there is some question of negligence, injured parties evidently
recover under these policies as a matter of course. No litigation occurs and the doctrine of governmental immunity is
ignored. It would seem, however, that the payment of premiums for insurance which is not authorized and cannot be
legally enforced is improper and might subject those officials
responsible for authorizing such payments to liability for an
improper expenditure of public funds."8 6 These uncertainties
surrounding the state's insurance deserve prompt legislative
attention.
VI. PRACTICE

In trying to secure compensation from the state and its
political subdivisions for injuries caused by their activities,
the primary concern may well be the question of whether or
not the particular governmental entity enjoys immunity
under the circumstances. However, the manner in which the
claim is presented is frequently no less important.
Once it is determined that a person has been damaged by
the activities of a governmental unit, the first formal step
should be to present the claim to that unit. The Wyoming
Constitution forbids the disbursement of public moneys "un333. Interview with Lee Galeotos, Director of Department of Administration and
Fiscal Control of State of Wyoming, in Cheyenne, Wyo., Aug. 3, 1971.
334. See policy on file in the Office of the Division of Finance & Budget of
University of Wyoming, in Laramie, Wyo. The University has been told
by the Wyoming Attorney General that it has the discretion to purchase
such insurance. Wyo. Att'y Gen. Op. May 17, 1951 in OPINIONS OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WYOMING 1948-53, 541 (1953).
335. Id.; Galeotos, supra note 333.
336. See notes 299-301 supra and accompanying text. An additional problem
raised by the doubtful propriety of the state's liability insurance purchases
is what ought a court to do when the state or any other governmental entity declines to raise the immunity defense. See p. 653 infra.
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til a full itemized statement in writing, certified to under
penalty of perjury, shall be filed .

. .

. ,,3,

For some levels

of government, statutes have been enacted reiterating this
requirement... and in some cases adding further qualifications. 8 9 One should check the laws relating to the governmental body against which a claim is being presented. Failure
to present a claim in the proper form may result in loss of a
right to sue, 4" even in a situation where the legislature has
consented to suit." 1 In addition presentation of the claim to
the proper acccounting officer of the governmental body may
be necessary."' This presentation requirement cannot be met
by first obtaining a judgment and then presenting the verified
judgment as a claim,"' except that once litigation has commenced on common law causes of action the failure of the
governmental defendant to make timely objection to the absence of any presentation of a certified claim may result in
a waiver of the requirement." '
In addition to the constitutional and statutory requirements for presentation of claims, it is advisable to first present one's claim to the appropriate governmental entity because it is apparently a widespread practice for meritorious
claims to be paid even if the doctrine of immunity would have
barred courtroom recovery. Municipalities have indicated
that they paid modest claims even when they did not carry
337. WYO. CONST. art. 16. § 7.
338. WYO. STAT. §§ 15.1-158, -196, -275 (municipalities); § 18-143 (counties);
(1957).
339. See WYo. STAT. § 9-71 (1957) which provides that evidence in support of
claim must be included and claims must be submitted within one year after
they accrue and Wyo. STATS. § 15.1-275 (1957) which provides notice must
be submitted within 30 days of injury or damage and actions thereon
must be commenced within one year.
340. Price v. State Highway Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946); Board
of Comm'rs v. Denebrink, 15 Wyo. 342, 89 P. 7 (1907); Houtz v. Board of
Comm'rs, 11 Wyo. 152, 70 P. 840 (1902) (But as dicta the court indicates
that tort claims may not have to be so presented.)
341. Utah Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951
(1933); accord Beiber v. City of Newcastle, 242 F. Supp. 457 (D. Wyo.
1965).
342. Price v. State Highway Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946); Utah
Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dept., 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 (1933).
343. Utah Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951
(1933).
344. Town Council v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 263 P. 703 (1928). But cf. Houtz v.
Board of Comm'rs, 11 Wyo. 152, 70 P. 840 (1902) (Failure to object during
prelitigation negotiations to the lack of any proper claim presentment does
not constitute a waiver of the requirement.).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972

35

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 7 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 12

652

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VII

insurance. 45 State agencies, which enjoy broad immunity,
carry liability insurance with doubtful legislative authorization. 46 Since these policies prohibit the carrier from raising the immunity defense, claims are regularly paid notwithstanding the fact that the state could prevent courtroom recovery by pleading governmental immunity. Finally, there
is a statutory procedure whereby the State Auditor can pass
upon claims and allow them. 4 ' Should he lack the appropriations to pay the claim or if the claimant is not satisfied, the
Auditor is to present the matter to the next session of the
legislature. 4 Although the legislature may by special act
then compensate the injured party, it has not done so in any
of the last five legislative sessions. Very few people have
pursued this procedure or presented their claims to the
legislature. 4 9

If the governmental entity refuses to pay the claim, the
injured party may initiate an action in court. Although one
statute indicates that the action is in the nature of an appeal,35
the cases hold that it is not.3 ' The government's denial of
the claim is not given any evidentary weight; the claimant
is entitled to a trial de novo. 52
In litigating the liability of the governmental entity, the
burden of proof on the immunity issue is important. It has
been held that the plaintiff has the responsibility of alleging
and the burden of proving that the defendant governmental
unit was acting in a proprietary capacity. 3 This would place
the burden on the plaintiff of proving that his action is not
barred by immunity. Apparently the immunity issue would
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

350.
351.

352.
353.

Survey, note 304 supra.
See pp. 648-50 supra.
WYO. STAT. §§ 9-71 to -73, -75 to -77 (1957).
WYO. STAT. §§ 9-75 and -76 (1957).
Interviews with Sterling Case, Deputy Attorney General of State of Wyoming, in Cheyenne, Wyo., August 3, 1971, and with State Senator Richard
R. Jones, Chairman of Wyoming State Senate Ways & Means Comm. in
Cody, Wyoming, Jan. 19, 1972.
WYO. STAT. § 15.1-255 (1957).
Fanning v. City of Laramie, 402 P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1965); State v. Patterson,
47 Wyo. 416, 38 P.2d 617 (1934); Boswell v. County Commissioners, 1 Wyo.
235 (1875) ; cf. Van Buskirk v. Red Buttes Land & Live Stock Co., 24 Wyo.
183, 156 P. 1122 (1916).
Id.
Savage v. Town of Lander, 77 Wyo, 157, 309 P.2d 152 (1957).
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not have to be raised as an affirmative defense. It has been
held that the issue is raised by a general denial." 4
Suppose a governmental unit decides not to assert immunity but a dispute arises on another issue such as negligence or the amount of damages and the injured party initiates litigation. Either the court must itself raise the immunity issue and if appropriate dismiss the action or it must
defer to the judgment of the governmental unit as to whether
or not the issue should be considered. The former position
would be granting an uncommonly active role to the court,
perhaps an undesirable one since the court would be interfering without request in the judgment made by other competent units of government-in some cases the executive branch
of state government. However, the latter position would allow
the apparent intent of the legislature to retain immunity to
be violated willy nilly by any governmental unit that saw fit.
It would seem that the absence of cogent reasons for preserving immunity and the availability of taxpayer actions to protect the public treasury... would indicate that there is little
need for judicial initiative in this matter. To date the Wyoming court has declined to dispose of a case on the ground of
immunity unless requested to do so by the government entity before it."'6
Assuming, however, that the government has declined to
pay, raising the immunity defense, and that it has lost on that
issue, the next problem is establishing liability. The burdens
of proof and going forward and the rules of evidence ought
to be the same in this area as in any similar trial between two
private litigants. It is of interest that on the evidentary

question of whether the fact of insurance coverage is admissable in a jury trial, the Wyoming court followed the usual
rule requiring the exclusion of such evidence. 57
854. Id.; Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.Zd 808
(1959).
355. See Twitchell v. Bowman, 440 P.2d 513 (Wyo. 1968); cf. Stratton v. City
of Riverton, 74 Wyo. 379, 287 P.2d 627 (1955); Quackenbush v. City of
Cheyenne, 52 Wyo. 146, 70 P.2d 577 (1937).
356. E.g., Caillier v. City of Newcastle, 423 P.2d 653 (Wyo. 1967); Town Council v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 263 P. 703 (1928).
857. Miller v. City of Lander, 453 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1969).
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At the point a judgment is entered against a governmental unit, the plaintiff may face problems. If the public defendant cannot or will not pay, some device to enable and
enforce payment must be found. Since public property is
generally exempt from execution, 8 ' that is not the answer.
One possible source of funds is judgment bonds, i.e., obligations issued to raise moneys to pay off judgments. Wyoming
municipalities3 5 9 and counties 6 ' are authorized to issue them
without regard to debt limit restrictions."' Presumably a
writ of mandamus could be secured ordering both the issuance of such bonds and payment of the judgment out of bond
proceeds. 2 If there is no statutory authority for judgment
bonds, as is the case with the state and all special districts,
including school districts, but there are available funds to
satisfy the judgment, a writ of mandamus might be available
to compel the issuance and honoring of a warrant to pay such
a judgment. 3 ' But since there are both constitutional and
statutory requirements for legislative appropriations prior
to the disbursement of state funds.. 4 and since it is unlikely
prior appropriations could be construed to make money available for a particular judgment, the writ would have to be directed also to the state legislature. Obviously this would be
such an extraordinary writ that its issuance, to say nothing
Perhaps the
of its enforcement, would be highly unlikely.6
358. See Special School Dist. No. 3 v. Western Tube Co., 13 Wyo. 304, 356, 80 P.
155, 179 (1905) (dicta). See also 30 AM. JUR. 2d Executions § 195 (1967);
2 ANTIEAU, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW 16.28 (1971). There may be exceptions
to the general rule prohibiting execution on government property. See
Wyo. STAT. § 18-55 (1957) implying that execution may issue against
counties. Also municipal property not held for governmental or public
purposes may be subject to execution. Id. ANTIEAU. Of course, a judgment against a public officer or employee might be satisfied by execution
on his private property or by garnishment of his salary. See note 232 supra
and accompanying text with respect to garnishment.
359. WYo. STAT. § 15.1-484 (Supp. 1971).
360. WYO. STAT. § 18-55 (1957).
361. WYO. STAT. § 39-62 (1957); see also Wyo. STAT. § 15.1-254 (1957). Wyo.
STAT. § 21-76 (1957) (Repealed by Ch. 111, § 292, Wyo. LAWS 1969) had
authorized school districts to issue judgment bonds. The 1969 recodification
of the school code omitted any provision for judgment bonds. Compare
WYO. STAT. § 21-76 with § 21.1-253 (Supp. 1971).
362. 2 ANTIEAU, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 16.23 (municipalities); see 4 ANTIEAU, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 40.05 (counties).
363. See Commonwealth v. Circuit Court, 365 S.W.2d 107 (Ky. 1963); Raleigh
County Bank v. Sims, 137 W. Va. 599, 73 S.E.2d 526 (1952). Cf. Antieau,
supra note 362.
364. WYo. CONST. art. 3, § 35; art. 16, § 7. Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-57, -59 (1957,
Supp. 1971). See State ex rel. Henderson v. Burdick, 4 Wyo. 272, 33 P. 125
(1893); but cf. Donnellan v. Nicholls, 1 Wyo. 61 (1872).
365. See Annot., 136 A.L.R. 677 (1942).
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only possible remedy would be to try to enforce the judgment
against state assets in another jurisdiction. But this too is an
uncertain remedy. Even in the case of school districts, the
provisions of the Municipal Budget Act . 6 impose requirements akin to an appropriation and whether the writ of
mandamus would be available to compel the school board to
make such an appropriation is questionable. Absent available funds or a statutory scheme for satisfying judgments,
a judgment against a governmental entity is worth no more
than the good will of the officials who control the govermuent.
VII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of governmental immunity in Wyoming is
an imbroglio. Although the governmental-proprietary distinction is sometimes blurred or even violated, it appears to
draw the basic line between immunity and liability for government in this state. Yet the lack of any cases actually imposing liability upon the state, its agencies or employees for proprietary activities makes the relevance of the distinction to
that area a promise based upon dicta. Also, exceptions to
immunity for governmental activities may be found in municipal liability for defective public ways, possibly for nuisance and in one case for the violation of a statutory duty to
maintain a stop sign. Statutory authority exists for both
municipalities and school districts to purchase liability insurance and to waive immunity for governmental functions to
the extent of insurance. In both areas coverage is extensive.
State agencies are also purchasing liability insurance on their
vehicles, although the authority is questionable at best and the
impact on immunity is doubtful. In addition, piecemeal legislation authorizes suit and provides for state responsibility in
certain areas and on occasion for particular claims.
Apart from the legislature's authorizing insurance, the
immunity doctrine in Wyoming is as strong as it has ever
been. Why this doctrine, with its admitted injustices, is still
law is hard to understand. The Wyoming Supreme Court
has recognized the unfairness of governmental immunity in
366. WYo. STAT. § 9-525, -531, -539 (1957, Supp. 1971); § 21.1-41 (Supp. 1971).
Cf. School Dist. No. 3 v. Western Tube Co., 5 Wyo. 185, 38 P. 922 (1895).
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several of the cases in which it has upheld the doctrine." 7 The
court places responsibility for change upon the legislature. 68
Except for modest steps in certain areas, the legislature has
apparently not yet found the immunity question compelling
enough to consider.
Although the legislature admittedly has the power to
abolish or limit governmental immunity, the court shares this
power and therefore must share the responsibility for the perpetuation, as well as the origin, of the doctrine. Despite the
entrenched nature of the immunity doctrine in other states,
in the last fifteen years courts in seventeen jurisdictions have
stopped echoing the excuse that they were without power to
change the doctrine and have judicially abolished immunity
for some and in a few cases for all levels of government."'
Although courts in eleven other states, not including Wyoming, have reiterated their reluctance to abolish immunity, 7 '
367. Davis v. Board of County Comm'rs, 495 P.2d 21 (Wyo. 1972); Denver
Buick, Inc. v. Pearson, 465 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1970); Bondurant v. Board of
Trustees, 354 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1960); Maffei v. Incorporated Town of
Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 119 (1948); Wilson v. City of Laramie,
65 Wyo. 234, 199 P.2d 119 (1948); ef. Ramirez v. City of Cheynne, 34
Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710 (1925).
368. Davis v. Board of County Comm'rs, 495 P.2d 21 (Wyo. 1972); Denver
Buick, Inc. v. Pearson, 465 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1970); Bondurant v. Board of
Trustees, 354 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1960); Maffei v. Incorporated Town of
Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 119 (1948); Wilson v. City of Laramie,
65 Wyo. 234, 199 P.2d 119 (1948); Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo.
67, 241 P. 710 (1925); Hjorth Royalty Co. v. Trustees of Univ. of
Wyoming, 30 Wyo. 309, 222 P. 9 (1924).
369. Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Parish v. Pitts,
244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n,
93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.
2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Evans v. Board of Comm'rs,
Colo ......... , 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,
-------96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) ; Smith v. Idaho, 93 Ida. 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970) ;
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959); Klepinger v. Board of Comm'rs, 143 Ind. App. 155, 239 N.E.2d 160
(1968); Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969); Haney v.
City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964) ; Williams v. City of Detroit,
364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist.,
264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb.
430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968) ; Willis v. Department of Conserv. & Econ. Dev.,
, 261
R.I ....
55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Becker v. Beaudoin, ....
A.2d 896 (1970); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d
See
(1963).
605
382
P.2d
Nev.
253,
79
County,
v.
Clark
618 (1962); of. Rice
also City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962); Hamilton
v. City of Shreveport, 247 La. 783, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965); Bernardine v.
City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945); Kelso v. City of
Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964). For discussions of the trends
in these states see 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 25.00 (Supp. 1970);
Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 918.
370. Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 256 Iowa 337, 127 N.W.2d 606
(1964); Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 687
(1961); Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 271 A.2d 547 (1970); Clark v.
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it is clear that American courts legitimately possess the prerogative of excising governmental immunity from the common
law and that the trend is in that direction. Perhaps it is
simply a case of differences of opinion on the proper role of
the judiciary. However, when all concede the unfairness of
immunity and the need for reform, the protestations of the
reluctant judges in the face of action by their counterparts
in other states are difficult enough for the lawyer, much less
the layman, to appreciate. The hope that legislators will take
up the task is belied by the fact that of the nine states that
in the last ten years have moved toward a policy of governmental responsibility by legislation, seven did so only after
a judicial decision abrogating the doctrine, while only two
did it without such prompting."' The lesson seems to be that
without judicial abrogation of immunity the problem does not
command that degree of attention which prompts legislative
action.
To date the Wyoming court has refused to take the initiative even in restricting governmental immunity. It has
explained this refusal on two grounds: 1) by pointing to the
state constitutional provision permitting the legislature to
provide for suits against the state3 72 and 2) by finding that
the doctrine was a part of the English common law prior to
1609 and thus by statute became a part of Wyoming's law."'
As for the fixst ground, the suggested construction of the
Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hosp., 72 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963) ; Fette v. City
of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963); Gossler v. City of Manchester,
107 N.H. 310, 221 A.2d 242 (1966); Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d
601 (N.D. 1965); Hyde v. City of Lakewood, 2 Ohio St. 2d 155, 207 N.E.2d
547 (1965); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Board of -County Comm'rs, 389 P.2d
476 (Okl. 1964); Conway v. Humbert, 82 S.D. 317, 145 N.W.2d 524 (1966) ;
State v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962) ; cf. Vendrell v. School
Dist., 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961); Cunningham v. County Court, 148
W. Va. 303, 134 S.E.2d 725 (1964).
371. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 25.00 (Supp. 1970). In only one state, Arkansas, has the legislature restored immunity after the court abolished it.
See Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968) ; ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2901 (Supp. 1971). However, even this restoration was accompanied
by a requirement that political subdivisions purchase liability insurance
for all motor vehicles. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-2903 (Supp. 1971).
372. WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 8. See previous installment of this article at pp. 235-38.
373. Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
Wyo. STAT. § 8-17 (1957). See previous installment of this article at p. 241.
In a decision dated after publication of the first installment of this article
the Wyoming court reaffirmed this conclusion. Davis v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 495 P.2d 21 (Wyo. 1972). In fact, in Davis the court even out
does its reasoning in Mallei by suggesting that the legislature actually
passed upon the immunity question.
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constitution is certainly not obligatory, as decision in two other
states have shown. 74 Rather the constitution can be viewed as
merely authorizing the legislature to provi.de procedures for
suing the state if it so desires. If no procedure is provided,
immunity need not be the result. In addition provisions of the
state consti.tution guaranteeing the availability of courts to
hear claims.7 5 and guaranteeing compensation for damages
caused by state action.7 . would certainly provide a foundation
for a reformulation of the Wyoming position.
The second ground is also subject to criticism. Whether
governmental immunity was a part of the English common
law in 1609 and thus is, by statute, the law in Wyoming is an
interesting historical question. The fact that legal scholars
have without exception been unable to trace the common law
origins of governmental immunity back as far as 1609,"'
makes the Wyoming accomplishment all the more singular.
Even assuming that the research of the Wyoming court is correct, at the very least this would seem to be an example of the
type of common law precedent from which a court would be
free to depart. It is usually held that the common law is only
adopted to the extent it is in harmony with the genius, spirit
and objects of local institutions. 7 That immunity is not so in
harmony with local institutions has been admitted by the
Wyoming court on many occasions."' Although the Wyoming
court has claimed the immunity doctrine is too firmly established in common law to allow its judicial abrogation, 8 ° the
374.

375.
376.
377.

Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1961) ; Perkins v. State, 18 Ind. 555, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969).
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 33.
In VAN ALSTYNE, A STUDY RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, 205 n.36
(Cal. Law Revision Comm'n 1963) the author lists three sources of background information on the case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep.
359 (K.B. 1778). None of the three found any clear prior common law precedent for the immunity doctrine. See DAVID, MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR
TORTIous ACTS AND OMMISSIONS 30-45 (1936); Barnett, The Foundations
of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the
Common Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 ORE. L. REV.

250 (1937) ; Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4145

(1924).

378. Fuchs v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 P.2d 78 (1945); State v. Foster, 5 Wyo.
199, 38 P. 926 (1895) ; accord, Johnson v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 28 Utah
46, 76 P. 1089 (1904) (construing the Wyoming statute).
379.

See cases cited note 367 supra.

380. E.g., Davis v. Board of County Comm'rs, 495 P.2d 21 (Wyo. 1972);
Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
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actions of courts in sister states, as noted, make this claim
hollow. In addition, the apparent willingness of the Wyoming
court to abolish charitable immunity makes the claim appear
arbitrary. 8'
When a court does take the initiative to change a common
law principal of long standing it faces a problem of how to
announce its decision. 2 Two considerations have been particularly troublesome. First, the abrupt change of a doctrine
upon which many have relied can be unfair unless a period
of time is given to plan for the change. This is particularly
true of a change such as abolition of governmental immunity
where even the purchase of liability insurance may require
legislative appropriation. Thus several of the courts which
have abolished immunity have done so prospectively, even
allowing for a considerable lapse between the date of decision
and the effective date of change. 3 Although such changes
are similar to legislation, the technique of prospective overruling is accepted in American jurisprudence.8 4 This is not
to say that prospective overruling does not create problems.
How should the plaintiff in the landmark case be treated? If
he is not rewarded for his efforts, there is little incentive to
challenge outdated concepts and the decision is mere dicta.
381. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y v. Yepsen, 469 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1970). Although the rationale and history of charitable immunity and governmental
immunity are not identical, the one-time strength of the doctrines in American common law is comparable.
382. For an excellent discussion of this problem which is the basis for many of
the subsequent comments in this paragraph see Comment, The Role of the
Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964 DUKF L.J. 888 (1964).
383. E.g., Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs -......
Colo -. ------482 P.2d 968
(1971) (decided March 22, 1971; applied only to plaintiffs in that case,
companion cases and causes of action arising after June 30, 1972) ; Spanel
v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) (only
applied to causes of action arising after the adjournment of the next
regular session of the legislature) ; Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430,
160 N.W.2d 805 (1968) (only applied to causes of action arising 30 days
after the date of the opinion) ; Willis v. Department of Conserv. & Econ.
Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970) (decided April 20, 1970; only applied
to the plaintiff and to causes of action arising after January 1, 1971);
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) (only
applied to the plaintiff and to causes of action arising 40 days after the
decision). At least two courts have, on the other hand, made the abolition
of immunity effective as to all actions not barred by the statute of limitations. Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 92 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963);
Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W. 2d 738 (Ky. 1968).
384. E.g., Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
See Levy, Realistic Jurisprudenceand Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 1 (1960); Note, Prospectively Overruling the Common Law, 14
SYRACUSE L. REV. 53 (1962).
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Further, the unfair doctrine is allowed at least to preclude
other parties injured before the effective date of the decision
from recovering. What the court needs to do is balance the
inconvenience to the public bodies of immediate change
against the unfairness to injured individuals. It is submitted
that except for allowing the plaintiff in the landmark case
to recover, the interests of public bodies in planning for the
change is more important. This was the approach taken by
the Colorado Supreme Court in Evans v. Board of County
Com,'rs when it allowed the plaintiffs to recover and then
gave the legislature over fifteen months to deal with the
problem."' 8
The second consideration is the extent to which governmental responsibility ought to be imposed. Even the most
outspoken critics of the governmental immunity doctrine concede that certain areas of activity ought not give rise to liability.8 The problem of determining precisely what areas
of activity ought not to give rise to liability is one that both
the court and the legislature would face if either decided to
abolish or limit the doctrine. A court in deciding the case before it is not accustomed to making detailed policy statements
to guide the community as to the precise application of that
case. Although a court which decides to abolish the immunity
doctrine might find the task of limiting its decision difficult,
governmental entities would find some guidance essential if
the new liability is to be insured against. If the effective date
of the decision is delayed, the legislature would undoubtedly
take up the problem. One writer has suggested that:
Judicial abolition of the governmental immunity doctrine is warranted in order to press legislative machinery into operation. In its abrogating
opinion, the court should balance the public policy
factors involved on a case-by-case basis and attempt
to establish an interim solution as to the limits of
governmental liability. The objectives of such a solu385 ........
Colo -....-- , 482 P.2d 968 (1971). In 1971 the Colorado legislature responded to the Evans decision by adopting a far reaching act which provides
for governmental responsibility in but a few areas. See ch. 323, CoLO. LAWS
1971.
386. E.g., 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §§ 25.11 to .13, 25.16 (1958, Supp.
1971).
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tion should be to provide a workable framework
which will instill confidence within public entities
and the legislature, thus facilitating a climate in
which an orderly, comprehensive legislative solution
can grow. Furthermore, it is the court's responsibility to reduce the impact of its decision on the fiscal
resources of public entities. This can best be done by
a selective use of the flexible and workable device of
prospective abolition. 87
In any event, the Wyoming legislature will hopefully
take up the problem of governmental responsibility. If it
does, it should take the time to study the experience of other
states, particularly California. 8 s It is suggested that the legislation should consider the following: First, any statute should
apply to all levels of government. Second, the manner in
which legislation then deals with governmental liability may
follow one of the several approaches adopted by other states. 89
These approaches include a general waiver of immunity with
broad exceptions, codification of the governmental immunity
doctrine with certain broad categories of liability and specifically defined immunities and liabilities. Third, legislation
should probably include some limits upon liability for discretionary acts where policy alternatives are actually weighed,
and possibly also a limit on the dollar amount of liability in
those areas where immunity is abolished. 9 Fourth, to the
extent a statute abolishes immunity it should be clear that
both the immunity from suit and the immunity from liability
887. Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity,
1964 DuE L.J. 888, 900.
388. Subsequent to the decision of Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961), in which the California Supreme
Court abolished governmental immunity, the state legislature declared a
moratorium on the litigation of claims (ch. 1404, p. 3209, CAL. LAWS 1961)
during which time the California Law Revision Commission completed a
study of the immunity doctrine in the state (VAN ALSTYNE, A STUDY RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1963)) and made detailed legislative
recommendations (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 4
CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N 801 (1963)). With minor changes these recommendations were enacted by the legislature as the California Tort Claims
Act of 1963. CAL. GOV'T CODE, §§ 810 to 996.6 (West. 1966). Set Van Alstyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919,
937-40.
389. See generally VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 888, at 968-74 upon which what
follows in this paragraph is based.
390. Colorado for example limits liability for injury to $100,000 for one person
and $300,000 for two or more persons in one accident or to the limit of
liability insurance, whichever is greater. Ch. 323, § 130-11-14, COLO. LAWS
1971.
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are being eliminated. By construing many early statutes as
merely waiving suability, courts granted plaintiffs a visit to
the courthouse. 9' Finally, although most statutes are only
addressed to problems of tort liability, this writer would suggest that governmental immunity in the area of contract liability also be abolished. Certainly the understandable requirements that a contract be of the type authorized by law
and that the manner of its execution be in conformity with
statutory requirements, if any, are sufficient to safeguard
the public.
In sum, the degree of immunity from damage actions
now enjoyed by government entities in Wyoming is unfair
to those persons injured by such entities. It is unfair in that
contrary to modern concepts of loss allocation the innocent
injured party must bear the risks of governmental wrongs in
a wide variety of areas. Although the harshness of the doctrine of governmental immunity has been ameliorated by liability for proprietary activities and the authorization for
school district and municipal liability insurance, there remain
Wide areas where immunity still prevails. To date judicial
obeisance to the policy of stare decisis and legislative inertia
have prevented any substantial progress. It is suggested that
the court does have the power to abrogate the immunity doctrine and that this is perhaps the most effective method of attracting legislative attention to the problem and of facilitating a comprehensive solution.

391. Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. R~v. 1363,
1365 (1954).
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